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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF KENTUCKY STATUTE SEC-
TION 2635: APPLIANCES FOR THE PREVENTION
OF VENEREAL DISEASES.
1.
As a result of a series of state and federal decisions it is
well established that a state, acting under its police power to
protect the public health and morals, has a right to regulate the
use of birth control measures and the dissemination of knowl-
edge concerning their use.1 Some states have gone so far as to
prohibit completely all birth control measures and the giving of
information concerning the use thereof.2 Other states have
adopted similar statutes but have provided for an exception in
cases in which, as a result of a physician's determination, such
precautions are deemed necessary for the preservation of the life
or health of an individual.3 Other jurisdictions, much more
liberal than the two classes mentioned, do not attempt to restrict
the use of such methods, but have enacted measures limiting the
sale of such goods and/or prescribing certain standards to which
all contraceptives sold within the state must conform. 4 Ken-
tucky comes within this last group.5
The Kentucky statute was passed by the Legislature under
the title: "An Act relating to the sale, control and licensing of
the sale of appliances, drugs and medicinal preparations intended
or having special utility for the prevention of venereal
I Com. v. Gardner, - Mass. -, 15 N. E. (2nd) 222 (1938);
People v. Sanger, 222 N. Y. 192, 118 N. E. 637 (1918); State v. Arnold,
Wis. -, 258 N. W. 843 (1935). Accord: Youngs' Rubber Corp. v.
C. I. Lee & Co., (2d cir.) 45 F. (2d) 103, 107 (1930); Lanteen Labora-
tories v. Clark, 294 Ill. App. 811, 13 N. E. (2d) 678 (1938).2Mass. Gen. laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 272, sec. 21, See: Com. v. Gardner,
- Mass. -, 15 N. E. (2d) 222 (1938).
IN. Y. Penal Law, Consol. Laws, c. 40, sec. 1145. See: People v.
Sanger, 222 N. Y. 192, 118 N. E. 637 (1918).4 Idaho L (1937) c. 72, sec. 6; Ore. Code Ann. Supp. (1935) sec.
68-2066-2068; Wis. Stat. (1933) sec. 351, 235. See: State v. Arnold,
- Wis. -, 258 N. W. 843 (1935).
rKy. Stat. (Carroll's 1939 Supp.) sec. 2635c.
NoTEs
diseases."r, Obviously the measure was intended to regulate
the public morals incidentally, if at all; for nowhere in the statute
appears any restriction upon the purchase of such goods, all per-
sons being allowed to buy, irrespective of age or of whether they
are married or single. The title indicates that the purpose of the
act is to regulate conditions affecting the public health, and in
order to be sustained as such, the statute must be recognized as
a valid measure for that purpose, authorized under the general
police power of the state.
The legislatures and courts of other states, particularly
Wisconsin7 and Tennessee,8 have considered similar measures
as being designed primarily to regulate birth controlY But
whether the principal objective be the prevention of venereal
diseases or birth control, a reasonable regulation of either comes
within the police power of the state.
2.
The Kentucky statute is ostensibly aimed at a protection of
the public health, by providing for certain standards to which
all appliances used for the prevention of venereal diseases must
conform. As set out in Sec. 2635c-7, entitled "Requirements",
it is prescribed that a prophylactic rubber or appliance may not
be sold unless it is capable of enduring inflation from one cubic
foot of air, free from holes, imperfect rings or blisters, and
unpatched. In the recent case questioning the constitutionality
of the statute,' 0 it was not contended that such requirements
in themselves are either ineffective or unreasonable, and the
court did not consider that question. Regardless of whether
those standards provide for the best possible test of the goods
to be sold, it seems obvious that they are at least an attempt in the
desired direction, and that a compliance with such provisions
will lead to a better grade bf products and a consequent step
in the progress toward a prevention of venereal diseases-and
in the promotion of birth control. Hence the statute is not to
be questioned on that basis.
0 Ky. Acts, 1938, c. 55.
'Wis. Stat. (1932) see. 351.235.8 
cConnell v. City of Knoxville, - Tenn. -, 110 S. W. (2d)
478, 113 A. L. R. 966 (1937).
"gupra, n. 1.
20I arkendorf v. Friedman, 280 Ky. 484, 133 S. W. (2d) 516 (1939).
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A much more serious issue is presented by a consideration
of the limitation upon the right to sell these articles. See.
2635e-5, entitled "Retail Licenses", provides that a permit to
sell prophylactic rubbers shall be issued only to retail drug
stores operated by or employing one or more registered phar-
macists, and that sales shall be made only from the prescription
counters of such drug stores and by a registered pharmacist.
In the case of Markendorf v. Friedman," the appellee, who
operated a drug sundry department in a department store, con-
tended that the refusal of the State Board of Pharmacy to issue
him a license to sell prophylactic rubbers under this statute was
a violation of his rights under the Constitution of Kentucky and
under the due process clause and the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. He alleged the unreasonableness of the classification of
druggists having registered pharmacists as being peculiarly
qualified to determine whether or not merchandise of the char-
acter involved complies with the standards set up by section 7
of this act. In addition to the violation of his rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, he asserted that the statute was in
violation of section 3 of the Constitution of Kentucky, which
provides that no grant of exclusive privileges shall be made to
any man or set of men, except in consideration of public services;
and of section 59 of that same instrument, which prohibits special
or local legislation. The court held that the classification was
not unreasonable.12
It is unquestioned that the aforementioned constitutional
provisions do not forbid a classification based upon reasonable
and natural distinctions, 13 so the issue to be determined is
whether the classification in favor of druggists is manifestly arbi-
trary and unreasonable so as to exclude some without reasonable
basis in fact.' 4 If a valid ground for discrimination can be
found, or if reasonable minds might differ on the question,
n2 Spra, n. 10.
1The Supreme Court denied certiorari: 60 Sup. Ct. 610, 84 L. Ed.
554 (1.939).
,3 Louisville R. Co. v. Louisville Fire, etc., Assn., 151 Ky. 644, 152
S. W. 799 (1913).
"Com. ex rel. v. Griffen, 268 Ky. 830, 105 S. W. (2d) 1063 (1937).
NoTES
then the classification must be upheld, all doubts as to the consti-
tutionality of the act being resolved in its favor.15
Are registered pharmacists better able to make these tests
than is the ordinary merchant? Considering one of the require-
ments, the court admits that "any person is as qualified as a
registered pharmacist to determine whether or not an appliance
of this character is nine inches long."' 16 Obviously the basis
of the classification is not to be found here.
Looking at another of the requisites of such articles, it
would be difficult if not impossible to convince the ordinary
man that he is not as capable as a registered pharmacist of deter-
mining whether an article of this type is free of holes, imper-
fect rings or blisters, and unpatched. Due to the exceeding
thinness, the transparency, and the delicacy of such an appli-
ance, when it is inflated with a quantity of air any imperfec-
tion upon its surface should be readily apparent to anyone who
gives it a careful examination. No particular pharmaceutical
training, nor any scientific instruments or tests should be neces-
sary in determining the presence of defects of this type.
Such imperfections are obvious-res ipsa loquitur. We must look
further for a basis upon which the classification made by the
legislature can be founded.
The remaining requirement listed by the statute is that the
appliance must be capable of enduring inflation with one cubic
foot of air. It is admitted that there is little doubt that the
ordinary man or merchant is not capable of measuring the pre-
cise amount of one cubic foot of air, but that fact of itself cer-
tainly is neither indication nor evidence that a registered
pharmacist is able to do so, or even that he is more nearly quali-
fied to make that test than is the average merchant. The court
says: "We may assume, and no doubt the Legislature was justi-
fied in assuming, that a pharmacist has received some special
training along the lines of physics and chemistry, and is in a
better situation to make this test than the ordinary man."' 17
It is submitted that, in the absence of any direct evidence or
other proof upon the issue, and in view of its prior willingness
sColeman v. Hurst, 226 Ky. 501, 11 S. W. (2d) 133 (1928); Shaw
v. Fox, 246 Ky. 342, 55 S. W. (2d) 11 (1932).




to investigate legislative determinations as to fact,' 8 the court
should have looked to see if the facts as slated by the General
Assembly actually existed. Surely the conclusion of the court
could not be based upon the idea that it is within the ordinary
man's concept of the duties of a druggist that he customarily
measures quantities of air.19
In an effort to determine whether pharmacists can actually
make the inflation test of which the General Assembly has
deemed them capable, an investigation was made of fifteen drug-
stores, chosen at random from the Lexington, Kentucky, city
directory, each of which both employed registered pharmacists
and sold contraceptives. At this time, some two years after the
passage of the statute, every registered pharmacist who was
questioned stated that he was not qualified to make such a test.
Without exception, each pharmacist admitted that he did not
know how such a test would be made, and most of them made
the statement: "That is not in my line." The legislative classi-
fication on the basis of this requirement is absolutely without
foundation.
The conclusion seems inescapable that actually and practi-
cally the standards to be met by rubber appliances are such that
they may be determined by the average merchant just as well as
by a druggist employing a registered pharmacist, and that the
peculiar training received by a pharmacist is neither necessary
to a proper testing nor of any considerable value therein. Thus,
if druggists are no more capable of performing the statutory
tests than are other merchants, the statute giving to druggists
the exclusive right to sell those goods is not based upon a valid
classification. It is arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore
unconstitutional, both as denying to other merchants the equal
protection of the laws secured to them by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution, and as being a grant of ex-
clusive privileges other than in consideration of public services,
as prohibited by section 3 of the Kentucky Constitution.
ISFor instances in which the Kentucky court has gone behind the
legislative determination as to fact, see: Moore v. City of Georgetown,
127 Ky. 409, 105 S. W. 905 (1907); Richardson v. McChesney, 128 Ky.
363, 108 S. W. 322 (1908); Willis v. Jonson, 275 Ky. 538, 121 S. W.(2d) 904 (1938).
-g Perhaps a filling station operator with an air guage might be
better qualified than a registered pharmacist to make this test.
NOTES
Although a discussion of extra-legislative forces which may
have influenced the passage of this statute is not appropriafe
here,2 0 yet, outside of the constitutional question heretofore dis-
cussed, there are several features of this bill which are deserving
of comment. The title of this statute broadly embraces all
"appliances, drugs and medicinal preparations having special
utility for the prevention of venereal diseases."21 In striking
eontrast to these inclusive terms, the statute itself makes no
mention of "drugs and medicinal preparations", but is designed
to regulate only one particular article, which appliance comes
within the classification "contraceptives", and is more par-
ticularly referred to as a "condom". Why the Legislature should
confine its regulation of venereal disease preventives to but one
of a large class, and this in the face of an all inclusive title to
the Act, is unexplained.
It is interesting to consider just how a prosecution for a
violation of this statute would proceed if a druggist were ever
charged with selling prophylactic rubbers which did not comply
with the specifications as set out by the statute. It must be
remembered that the court has said that the average man is not
capable of making these tests. Then, a fortiori, he would not be
qualified to say whether someone else had made the same test.
In view of this fact, would it be possible to submit to a jury the
question of whether the articles involved complied with the
statutory requirements? The Legislature has not seen fit to tell
us just what mode of procedure would be followed in such an
instance.
The whole act causes one to wonder whether the actual work-
ing of the measure will not be confined solely to a restriction of
advertising of these articles, and a ban upon the sale of
prophylactic rubbers by any but the registered pharmacists of
the state-leaving the prevalence of venereal diseases in the
same condition in which the Legislature found it.
Measures somewhat similar to that taken by Kentucky have
been held valid by other courts, though not on grounds exactly
like the reasoning given in Markendorf v. Friedman. A munici-
In this connection note particularly sec. 4 of the Act, limiting
the issue of wholesale licenses to wholesale druggists. This was so
palpably unrelated to the averred intention of the act that the court in
Markendorf v. Friedman, unhesitatingly held it to be arbitrary.
0Supra, n. 6.
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pal ordinance was upheld by the Tennessee court on the ground
that it was a valid regulation of both the public morals and of
the public health.22 This Knoxville city ordinance differs from
the Kentucky statute in that a definite attempt was made to
regulate the public morals by restricting the sale of these devices
to persons over eighteen years of age. Further, no attempt was
made to set up standards to which all contraceptives must con-
form. A reading of the ordinance and of the decision in the
case referred to lead one to believe that the primary objective in
that instance was a regulation of the public morals, and not a
control of venereal diseases. The court said:
Certainly, the prohibition of the sale of contraception goods, except
by a licensed pharmacist at the prescription counter of a licensed drug-
store, or by a licensed physician, and only to persons more than eight-
een years of age, tends to preserve public morals, as well as the health
and safety of the people of the community, particularly the children
and the young men and women. It cannot be doubtful that the indis-
criminate sale of contraception goods by peddlers and vending
machines, at stores and filling stations, is a menace to the morals and
health of the people.?
The holding in this case shows a possible basis on which the
Kentucky statute could be sustained, if it were held to be dis-
criminatory as a health regulation. In view of the fact that the
tests outlined in the statute have been shown to be as easily
administered by any other merchant as by a registered phar-
macist, and hence that a discrimination on such grounds is not
reasonable, it is suggested that the more logical ground, and in
fact the only basis upon which Kentucky Statute 2635 may
rightfully be sustained, is that it is a measure designed to
protect the public morals.
B. H. HERNARD
"McConnell v. City of Knoxville, supra, n. 8. The Wisconsin
legislature made a similar classification in favor of druggists in Wis.
Stat. (1932) sec. 351.235, which statute was upheld in State v. Arnold,
- Wis. -, 258 N. W. 843 (1935) (however the issue as to the reason-
ableness of the classification was not argued nor considered by the
court, the statute being attacked by a filling station operator on the
grounds of vagueness of the terms thereof). Oregon has recently
passed a statute on this subject, Ore. Code Ann. Supp. (1935) 68-2068,
"Contraceptives-Labels and Standards", under which the state board
of pharmacy is given power to adopt such standards as may be deemed
necessary by the board, like the Kentucky statute, in sec. 68-2066 the
right to sell contraceptives is restricted to druggists employing one or
more registered pharmacists. At the present writing, no cases could
be found construing this statute.
21McConnell v. City of Knoxville, - Tenn. -, 110 S. W. (2d
478, 479 (1937).
